is but one of almost two hundred contributors to the formation of such law. 3 Moreover, customary law is difficult to ascertain and may not be a significant source of new international legal norms anyway. 4 But the Court's opinion says little about the treaty clause of the ATS, and the functional arguments against extraterritorial application of the treaty clause are weaker. Treaties have less of a democracy problem than customary law has. Treaties are negotiated and signed under the authority of the president, a democratically elected official. The popularly elected Senate must give advice and consent to ratification.
The historical arguments for extraterritorial application of the treaty clause are also stronger than those pertaining to the "law of nations" clause. Consider Attorney General William Bradford's 1795 opinion on the ATS, in which he said that the ATS might cover tortious actions by Americans overseas that violated a treaty between the United States and Great Britain. 5 The respondents in Kiobel distinguished the opinion on the grounds that it involved a treaty with extraterritorial effect. 6 For their part, the petitioners and the solicitor general argued that the opinion meant the ATS had extraterritorial effect, even in cases not involving a treaty. 7 Thus the Kiobel parties agreed on the proposition that the ATS might be an appropriate vehicle for a case involving a treaty with extraterritorial effect. 8 The Kiobel Court did not take a clear position on these historical arguments. Its reaction to the Bradford opinion, for example, was somewhat cryptic:
Attorney General Bradford's opinion defies a definitive reading and we need not adopt one here. Whatever its precise meaning, it deals with U.S. citizens who, by participating in an attack taking place both on the high seas and on a foreign shore, violated a treaty between the United States and Great Britain. The opinion hardly suffices to counter the weighty concerns underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality. 9 This passage did not unequivocally endorse the respondents' theory that the ATS covers a treaty with explicit extraterritorial reach, but it did not need to do so since Kiobel itself did not involve such a treaty. But does the last sentence quoted above mean that the Court would reject application of the ATS to a modern-day version of Bradford's case, even if that case involved a treaty of extraterritorial reach? Perhaps that situation is an example of what Justice Anthony Kennedy, the fifth vote on extraterritoriality, had in mind when he mentioned cases not covered "by the reasoning and holding of today's case."
10
None of the main participants in Kiobel-petitioners, respondents, the solicitor general, or the Court itself-took the position that the phrase "treaty of the United States" excludes treaties ratified after 1789. Scholarly commentators generally seem to assume that the ATS covers both pre-enactment and post-enactment treaties. For example, some debate exists about which treaty was at issue in the Bradford opinion: the 1783 Treaty of Paris, or the 1794 Jay Treaty? Thomas Lee argues that Bradford meant the Jay Treaty, which has the more "on-point" antineutrality rule. 11 Bradley and Ishai Mooreville argue that Bradford probably meant the Treaty of Paris because the Jay Treaty had been signed but not yet ratified in 1795.
12 Whatever the merits of this historical argument, 13 no one has suggested that the extraterritorial reach of the ATS's treaty clause depends on when the treaty entered into force.
14 In other areas of U.S. statutory law, a reference to a "treaty" ordinarily means treaties that predate the statute as well as treaties that postdate the statute, unless otherwise indicated. 15 Likewise, a plurality in the Supreme Court's ruling in Reid v. Covert held that the Supremacy Clause covers all treaties, regardless of whether they predate or postdate the Constitution. 16 Thus, whatever policy and historical considerations justify limiting the "law of nations" to the categories that the Court has sketched in Sosa and Kiobel, those considerations do not justify 10 Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring 13 Bradford issued his opinion on July 6, 1795, before the Jay Treaty entered into force, but just two weeks after the Senate gave conditional advice and consent to the treaty. The safer conclusion is that Bradford was thinking of the 1783 Treaty of Paris, not the Jay Treaty, especially as ratification of the Jay Treaty was controversial. At that time, of course, there was no Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 , 1155 UNTS 33, whose Article 18 obliges states to "refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of signed but unratified treaties. Moreover, Bradford was undoubtedly conscious of the constitutional requirement of ratification. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 314 (2007) (noting that "[t]he United States repeatedly had to remind other countries during the nineteenth century that its signature did not constitute a promise of ratification" (citing J. MERVYN JONES, FULL POWERS AND RATIFICA-TION 76 -77 (1946))). Bradford presumably understood the difference between Senate advice and consent and actual ratification by the president-a distinction sometimes lost on modern Americans. Still, the timing of Bradford's opinion creates some uncertainty. Moreover, the neutrality provision in the Treaty of Paris is less detailed than its counterpart in the Jay Treaty, which might have seemed more like the applicable lex specialis to Bradford. Article XXI of the Jay Treaty, for example, states that "the laws against all such offences and aggressions shall be punctually executed"; the Treaty of Paris contains no such provision.
14 Cf., e.g., Bradley, supra note 12, at 521 n.82 ("In any event, the issue [of which treaty Bradford had in mind] is not material to this essay."). 15 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §3184 (conditioning international extradition on the existence of a "treaty or convention for extradition"); cf. OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. Eur. Space Agency, 617 F. limiting "treaties" either to those treaties that existed in 1789 or to the types of treaties that existed in 1789. The framers of the ATS, like the framers of the Constitution, understood that the United States would enter into new and different treaties as the Republic evolved. They understood that the United States has far more control over "treaties of the United States" than over the brooding omnipresence that is the "law of nations." 17 They understood that the United States can pick and choose its treaties, whereas it cannot pick and choose its own customary law.
So if functional and historical concerns do not preclude extraterritorial application of the treaty clause of the ATS, does the self-executing treaty doctrine stand in the way? The Court's opinion in Sosa says it does. The Sosa Court dismissed the plaintiff 's reliance on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in one sentence: "And, although the Covenant does bind the United States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts." 18 The Court's invocation of the self-executing treaty doctrine in Sosa was mistaken. The doctrine does not mean that a non-self-executing treaty can never help create legal obligations in domestic courts-only that the treaty does not create such obligations by its own force. The obvious case is a non-self-executing treaty that is followed by congressional implementing legislation. In such a case, the treaty itself does not have direct force of law, but the statute implementing it does. 19 After Medellín v. Texas 24 raised doubts about the self-executing character of such treaties, the Senate changed its practice and began to include explicit statements that such treaties are self-executing in the resolution of advice and consent as part of a broader undertaking "to address uncertainty regarding the self-executing character of some U.S. treaties." 25 Through all of these developments, U.S. federal courts have continued to enforce extradition treaties, regardless of whether they are self-executing, because they are implemented by U.S. law. Courts should adopt the same approach to human rights treaties and the ATS. Hathaway and her coauthors are absolutely right when they suggest that "[t]he Alien Tort Claims Act . . . might be thought to be an additional mechanism for indirect enforcement of a treaty," along with other mechanisms, such as the federal habeas statute, section 1983, and the TVPA. 26 In a perfect world, Congress would step in and clarify the scope of the ATS. Failing that, perhaps the Senate might consider extending its new (and commendable) practice of stating explicitly when a treaty is self-executing. The best practice-long sought by human rights activists-would be for the Senate to declare that future human rights treaties are selfexecuting, at least insofar as their self-executing status would not violate constitutional norms. That declaration would get around the specious objection posed by Sosa, but it may be too much to ask.
Perhaps, instead, the Senate might consider a more modest variation on its new declaration practice. Rather than declare a human rights treaty to be self-executing, the Senate might say that " [t] he Senate declares that this treaty is a 'treaty of the United States' for the purposes of the Alien Tort Statute. Furthermore, the Senate declares that the Alien Tort Statute would be an appropriate vehicle for civil enforcement of the legal obligations in this treaty." (For that matter, the president could do so in the treaty text or when transmitting the treaty text to Congress.) If the treaty text is unclear about its extraterritorial reach, the Senate could express itself on that question as well. If the Senate determines that it would be inadvisable for the ATS to apply to a particular treaty, then the Senate should say so.
The Senate's declarations on self-executing status already have domestic legal consequences. 27 So should its declarations on other ways in which a treaty interacts with existing U.S. law. Like a declaration on self-executing status, such a declaration should not be dispositive, but it should be entitled to a certain amount of weight.
The ATS is, if you will, pre-implementing legislation-just like the extradition statute, section 1983, and the federal habeas statute. The ATS establishes jurisdiction over a civil claim for a tort in violation of a "treaty of the United States," not just a "self-executing treaty of the United States." It should be interpreted so that it means what it says.
